自2014年太陽花學運以後，許多新興小黨創立，進而在臺灣政壇形成一股新的第三勢力，民眾對於第三勢力與兩大黨的政黨偏好因素有何差別？本文採用「2022年臺灣社會變遷基本調查八期三次社會階層組」的問卷資料進行交叉分析與多元迴歸分析。研究發現：（1）階級投票與族群投票的分歧仍在，新中產階級相較非技術工人更支持第三勢力政黨，外省族群相較閩南族群更支持國民黨，但族群效果的強度低於過往研究；（2）政黨偏好的世代差異明顯，年輕世代更加支持第三勢力，在狹義第三勢力政黨的分析中，世代效果又強於廣義第三勢力中的影響力；（3）教育程度愈高的民眾愈可能支持第三勢力；（4）比較廣義第三勢力與狹義第三勢力的兩種分析後，發現兩種定義的結果類似，但狹義第三勢力支持者的教育程度更高、更不受族群因素左右、且更偏向青年世代。

Following the 2014 Sunflower Movement, the establishment of numerous emerging minor parties gave rise to a new “third force” in Taiwanese politics. This study examines how citizens’ party preferences toward this third force differ from those directed at the two major parties, drawing on data from the “2022 Taiwan Social Change Survey (Eighth Wave, Third Round) on Social Class.” Employing cross-tabulation and multiple regression analyses, the results are as follows: 1. Persistence of Class and Ethnic Cleavages: Class-based and ethnicity-based voting divisions still exist. Compared to non-skilled workers, the new middle class shows stronger support for third-force parties. Meanwhile, Mainlander (Waisheng) voters—relative to Minnan (Hoklo) voters—are more inclined to support the Kuomintang (KMT). However, the influence of ethnic factors is weaker than in earlier studies. 2. Generational Differences in Party Preference: There is a clear generational gap, with younger cohorts displaying greater support for the third force. Within a narrower definition of the third force, the effect of generation is even more pronounced than in the broader definition. 3. Role of Educational Attainment: Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to back third-force parties.4. Broad vs. Narrow Definitions of the Third Force: While analyses under both definitions yield similar results, supporters of the narrowly defined third force are generally better educated, exhibit weaker ethnic influences, and are more likely to come from younger generations.