• 研究生：:蕭又誠
• 論文名稱：社會階層、族群接觸對原住民我群勤惰認知之影響
• 指導教授：沈幼蓀
• 關鍵詞：原住民、泛原住民運動、認同、污名化認同

• 數千年前臺灣原住民的先祖即已在臺灣這塊土地安身立命、主宰一方。然而，四百多年來，隨著外來殖民政權的入侵嬗遞，漢人逐漸宰制了這塊土地，臺灣原住民族受到漢人的歧視與不公平對待卻無力反抗，污名化的認同因而形成。近幾十年來，臺灣經濟的快速發展，促使教育普及、教育水準提昇，強化了主流價值的傳遞，衝擊原住民原有的社會文化，也促使原住民對我群文化流失的反省；另外臺灣經濟型態的改變，使得大量的原住民勞動力流入城市之中，城市中原漢接觸的頻率與強度，也與鄉村—尤其是原鄉—大不相同。隨著時代環境的改變，原住民取得較高社經地位的機會增加 、城市原住民的與日俱增、泛原住民運動的刺激，也為原漢關係帶來新的發展與影響，本文旨在探究原住民受訪者的社經地位、原漢及人際接觸頻率、居住地城鄉差異，以及原運前後世代等屬性，對其原住民我群認同態度是否存在著正負向度的差距？以相關、迴歸等統計方法分析後，本文獲得以下發現：

1、教育程度越高的原住民，對原住民我群的勤惰認知越傾向負向。

2、每日接觸對象原住民比率越高者，對原住民我群認同態度越正向。

3、屬原運後世代的原住民，較原運前世代的原住民對我群認同態度正向。

然而，不論社經地位、人際接觸、居住地屬性與世代的差吸，大多數的原住民受訪者對漢人的勤惰評價，普遍高於對我群的勤惰評價，可見在長期殖民處境中，所受到的歧視、偏見，已在臺灣原住民的意念中，深化了我群的污名化認同。

• This study proposed a convex payoff executive compensation plan to encourage manager work harder and to mitigate the agency problem. This convex compensation program gives manager the same expected value as the common executive options does. However, the number of the options is a monotonic increasing and convex function of the future stock price. This allows manager to get more shares of options if the manager performs better. The research shows that managers will work harder and better off when they face this convex payoff executive compensation program than they face the common executive compensation plans does. However, a good quality manager will choose a more convex payoff function, work harder and gets a higher expected utility than a low quality manager does. This study also found that with reasonable high goal setting, manager will choose a more convex payoff function, work harder and will be better off. However, if the goal is too unreasonable such that it is almost impossible to attain the goal, then no executive compensation program can encourage manager work harder. Furthermore, given a reasonable high goal setting, this convex payoff compensation program exhibits screening effect or a signaling effect. This means that firm can discriminate high quality manager with low quality manager by using this compensation plan. No matter how risk averse the manageris. The good quality manager will always choose a more convex payoff function than a less risk averse poor manager does, no matter how risk averse he does. Hence manager picks a more convex payoff function signals that he is a good quality manager.