「治安」作為直覺上與警察串連的社會事實，大多是透過警員在工作中不斷

反覆實踐與建構的目標。然而，目前探討警察的研究多以制度設計與層級、績效

壓力等垂直面對警察的影響，以及勞動狀態與內容等水平面分開探討，忽略警員

在現場展現的應變策略與地方知識。本研究以勞動過程理論、基層官僚、社會建

構等框架對其勞動過程進行分析，揭示其作為勞動者的主體經驗、勞動過程，用

以串聯垂直與水平面的斷點，進一步揭示「治安」的生產過程。

本文以全台警員數前二之雙北（臺北、新北）派出所行政警察為研究對象，

以深度訪談輔以參與觀察、實際繞行轄區，描繪基層警察的勞動樣貌。研究揭示

警員為了順應體制的績效壓力和社會的遊戲規則，必須使用五種勞動策略，分別

為：「排序」、「 展演」、 「 挪調」、 「 交換」、 「 篩選」， 藉此串聯國家的數字目標與大

眾對安全的期待，用以完成任務和生存，而透過這些不同的勞動策略，我們可以

探討國家制度如何下達至社會又上達至國家，以及警員如何看待自身的產出。

警員的策略既建立於現有的結構中，也成為再製結構的一部分，警員會受到

經驗現象的影響，造成經歷與動機之間的脫節，從而在集體的認知中，看穿四種

埋下治安隱患的原因，分別為：「報案機制裂縫」、「扭曲的數字遊戲」、「專

業錯配」、「未知的社會風險」，進而對轄區與工作目標產生不信任感。最終，

用盡策略與看穿隱患後，警員在面對「長工時」、「 工作特殊性」等結構性牽制下

，會努力謀尋可能的職業路徑，試圖透過「轉調」、「升遷」、「換轄區」、「離職」

四條路徑來緩解勞動困境，卻會發現自己難以擁有真正離開體制的能力，仍自願

在不同職位或單位玩著同一套遊戲規則，成為既產生治安，卻也不相信治安的勞

動者。

論文外文摘要： The concept of public security, intuitively linked to the police, is a social reality constantly realized and constructed by officers through their routine work. However, existing research on the police often examines vertical influences (such as institutional design, hierarchy, and performance pressure) separately from horizontal factors, like labor conditions and content. This approach overlooks the adaptive strategies and local knowledge exhibited by officers in the field. This study employs frameworks including labor process theory, street-level bureaucracy, and social constructionism to analyze the police labor process. It unveils the subjective experiences and labor processes of police officers as laborers, bridging the gap between vertical and horizontal analyses, and ultimately revealing the process through which public security is produced.

This research focuses on administrative police officers in the precinct stations of Taipei and New Taipei City, which together account for the top two highest numbers of police personnel nationwide. Data was collected through in-depth interviews, supplemented by participant observation and actual patrol runs within the jurisdictions, to map the frontline police labor landscape. The findings reveal that officers must employ five labor strategies: "Prioritizing," "Performing," "Reallocating," "Exchanging," and "Screening," to reconcile the system's performance pressure with society's unwritten rules. These strategies serve to connect the state's numerical targets with the public's expectation of safety, enabling officers to complete their missions and survive. By analyzing these strategies, we explore how state policies permeate society and are channeled back to the state, and how officers perceive their own output.

These strategies are both constructed within the existing structure and become part of the structure's reproduction. Officers are influenced by empirical phenomena, leading to a disconnect between experience and motivation. This collective realization exposes four underlying causes of potential security vulnerabilities: "Gaps in the Reporting Mechanism," "The Distorted Numbers Game," "Professional Mismatch," and "Unknown Social Risks." This insight subsequently generates distrust towards their assigned jurisdiction and work objectives. Ultimately, after exhausting their strategies and recognizing these hidden vulnerabilities, and constrained by structural factors such as long working hours and the specificity of police work, officers attempt to seek alternative career paths. They look to four possible routes: "Transferring," "Promoting," "Changing Jurisdiction," and "Resigning," to alleviate their labor distress. Paradoxically, they often find it difficult to truly leave the system, willingly playing the same set of rules in different positions or units. They thus become laborers who both produce public security yet do not believe in it.