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From advocacy to service provision: state transformation and the disability rights movement in Taiwan

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ABSTRACT
This research uses the development of the disability rights movement in Taiwan as a case study to analyze the impact of state transformation, in particular marketization of social welfare policy, on the disability rights movement. First, the institutionalization of the disability rights movement enabled it to expand its organizational structure and become involved in shaping policy. Secondly, when disability rights organizations started to undertake state-funded projects, their focus shifted from advocacy to service provision. Thirdly, competition for limited state-funding gave the organizations led by urban-middle class advocates a significant advantage over small, community-based NPOs and gathered significantly greater resources. Finally, this paper suggests that, in a context in which the state did not provide basic social services for its citizens with disabilities, the institutionalization of SMOs turned advocacy groups into service providers. Although the number of disability civic organizations increased, the voices of advocacy groups were weakened.

Points of interest

- This article investigates the relations between disability rights organizations and the government in Taiwan.
- The article shows that when the Taiwanese disability rights movement advocated for disability welfare, the government adopted a new policy in which it subcontracted services for disabled citizens to disability rights organizations.
- Disability rights organizations became service providers and their focus shifted from advocacy to service provision.
- The market mechanism put disability rights organizations in competition for limited funding.
- The consequence of this policy resulted in unequal distribution of social services to disabled persons.
Introduction

A number of studies have addressed the connections between social policy, charity organizations, and the disability rights movement from a comparative perspective. This research uses the disability rights movement in Taiwan as a case to analyze the impact of state transformation on an advocacy movement. In the course of the country’s democratic transition from 1986 to 2000, the government gave funding to many disability rights social advocacy groups to provide services to disabled people. This funding transformed many disability social movement organizations into service-oriented, philanthropic non-profit organizations (NPOs). The possibility of disabled citizens gaining rights equal to those of able-bodied citizens thus has become dependent on a quasi-market system in which advocacy groups and NPOs compete for limited state funding and charitable donations. In a sense, groups once engaged in advocacy have become subcontractors to the state under new welfare policies. Under this marketized system, urban, middle-class families have the greatest access to social services, worsening the disparity between socio-economic classes.

Literature review

Social movement research shows that external resources and institutional structure reshape organizational structure and tactics of social movement organizations. Classic resource mobilization theory states that the emergence of new resources supports mobilization through the social movement sector (McCarthy and Zald 1987). In particular, when the welfare budget expands in the public sector, the government generally offers social movement organizations the opportunity to receive funding to expand their organizations’ services (McCarthy and Zald 1987; McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson 1991). While government funding provides an opportunity to expand an organization’s reach, it also transforms the organization. Piven and Cloward (1979) point out that when an elite group leads the process of institutionalization, organizations typically become less radical and the social movement goes into decline. Skocpol (2003) also shows that changes in government regulations, class structure, and professionalization and the emergence of new media since the 1960s have transformed many US national social movement organizations into interest groups that rely on a large professional staff to conduct fundraising, media relations, and lobbying. Civil organizations, Skocpol argues, advocate ‘for’ the people, but not ‘from’ the people, leading to ‘diminished democracy.’ Jenkins and Eckert (1986) do not believe that professionalization necessarily results in either the development or the decline of a movement; they argue that a professional elite channels communications between social movement organizations and the state.

Studies of disability rights movements in democratic countries other than Taiwan have addressed the movements’ relationships to welfare resources. Priestley
argues that the market-oriented community care system in the United Kingdom has reshaped the organizational goals and organizational autonomy of disabled people’s organizations. In a study focused in Northern Ireland, Acheson and Williamson (2001, 100) argue that ‘for disabled people, welfare structures are both a source of their dependence while at the same time offering one of the few potential routes to activism.’ In other words, disability advocacy groups need governmental resources, but relying on government funding can weaken their voices. Thus, relations between government and charity organizations have been a central concern for the disabled people’s movement. Shakespeare (2006) finds that disabled people’s movements criticize the discourse of charity even as they rely on charitable organizations’ services. Thus, Shakespeare calls for a change in the traditional ideology of charity needs and for the disabled people’s movement to maintain relations with charity organizations. Oliver (2009) points out that the effective incorporation of disability rights organizations into the state and over-reliance on big charity organizations to speak for disabled people will weaken the disabled people movement and reshape its agenda.

Resource mobilization theories suggest that welfare resources impose costs even as they provide significant resources. It is difficult to refuse the resources they provide, but institutionalization compromises social movements. Charity resources might play similar contradictory roles for disability rights’ organizations. The relationship between welfare resources and charity organizations is thus an area worthy of investigation. Studies on welfare resources to date have not addressed how the welfare resources distributed through NPOs influence social movements.

Many scholars recognize the danger of marketization of civil society. They call for accountability and transparency among civic organizations (Ku 2000; Kuan, Kao, and Pelchat 2003). They also point out that ‘consumers’ – those who need social welfare – do not have much autonomy to choose services. Their voices have been channeled through the advocacy groups that set up welfare regulations. Wang and Chang’s (2000) study of child care service found that the private management of the public facilities system does not promote diverse welfare services. Instead, service providers aim to fulfill the needs of the ‘majority’ in order to maximize their ‘profit.’ Consequently, this system reproduces unequal distribution of welfare resources.

This research investigates research questions about welfare resources, charity organizations, and the disability rights movement in relation to Taiwan. Since the 1980s, parents’ organizations and charity organizations have promoted disability rights in the country. This research will discuss how the new government policy known as ‘private management of public facilities’ (公辦民營 Gong-ban-ming-ying) is likely to transform disability rights organizations in Taiwan; the impact of the new welfare sources on the disability rights movement; and the consequence of the private management of public facilities in terms of the distribution of disability welfare in Taiwan.
Context: democratic transition and state–society relations in Taiwan

From 1986 to 2000, Taiwan transformed from an authoritarian developmental state to a liberal democratic state. Research shows that burgeoning civic organizations had significant influence on the progress welfare policies. For example, Wong (2004) suggests that the democratic transition provided a space for the social movement sector to promote welfare policies. Through media advocacy and strategic alliances with factions in different parties, social welfare movement activists pushed the state to define welfare policies and passed the well-regarded National Health Insurance in Taiwan. Thus, the developmental state was not weakened, but strengthened.

Many studies have also highlighted the burgeoning of civic organizations after martial law was lifted (Hsiao 1996; Ku 1999, 2003; Kuan, Kao, and Pelchat 2003). According to governmental registration records, 65% of the 3014 foundations and 29,496 associations operating in Taiwan in 2002 were established after 1987 (Kuan, Kao, and Pelchat 2003). Instead of directly challenging the state by pressing for democracy, civic associations started to play multiple roles, including fulfilling check-and-balance advisory functions in government, channeling society’s voice to the state, and providing direct services (Ku 1999, 2003). Many disability rights advocacy groups at this time attempted to build coalitions at the national level and ally themselves with other civic organizations. The League of Welfare Organizations for the Disabled and the Parents’ Association for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities (PAPID) exemplify this trend (Chang 2007). However, National Health Insurance might be an exceptional result of democratic transition. Other social welfare movements have not had the success of the Alliance for National Health Insurance that drove its adoption. The labor movement and environmental movement, for example, have not succeeded in many of their agendas, although some activists were recruited into the new government.

Under a liberal regime, multiple social forces have the ability to influence the state policy; democratization weakened the autonomy of the state (Ho 2005a, 2005b). Further, as Beckett (2006) argues, disability rights movements are different from identity-based and cultural-based social movements, because organizations also advocate for the distribution and discourse of rights and citizenship to the people it serves. Taiwan’s disabled people’s movement began to develop in 2004 (Chang 2015). Therefore, the identity politics issue in post-industrial society was not a significant issue in Taiwan during the transformation of the state.

In a liberal democratic system, most civic organizations cannot be completely detached from the state. Social issues need to be addressed through public policy, which in turn has an impact on the values, organizational structures, and functions of civic organizations, whether directly or indirectly. While Taiwan implemented many liberal social welfare policies during the transition to democracy, it did so by incorporating private management of public facilities into Taiwanese civic society. Private management of public facilities is a governmental policy of outsourcing
management of public programs to the private sector. In the case of a social welfare program, it refers to the state providing funding or facilities to NPOs that then manage and deliver social services (Liu 2000; Wang 2005). Taiwan’s social welfare policy formed from a specific welfare model. It is similar to what Garon (1998) observed in Japan, where the government incorporated activists and civic organizations in order to reduce the welfare burden of the state. In Taiwan, civic organizations advocated for social rights for citizens but distrusted whether the state would implement those rights efficiently. The state was unwilling to commit to protecting its marginalized populations and had no fiscal budget set aside for a universal welfare program.

In the context where the government was not willing to expand its bureaucratic body and civic organizations needed more resources to maintain their organization, Taiwan implemented the ‘private management of public facilities’ policy, in which the state contracted individual civic organizations to deliver social services. This policy established a symbiotic relationship between state and civic organizations. Representatives of civic alliances held positions on governmental advisory committees and the government released social welfare funding to individual service-oriented NPOs. Individual civic organizations thus had to compete for financial support from the state to provide social services. At the same time, the state gained power from civic service organizations by funding them. Marketization of care service has expanded state control over social services, rather than decreasing its intervention as reformers might have imagined (Wang 2005). This article explores how disability rights organizations developed under the new policy and state–society relationship.

**Method and data**

This study takes a realist approach to address the development of disability rights organizations in Taiwan and to examine the impact of private management of the public facilities policy on disability rights organizations and the disability rights movement. I focus on two of the most influential disability rights social movement organizations in Taiwan: PAPID and the League of Welfare Organizations for the Disabled. PAPID is an umbrella association for 37 local parents’ associations and 12 associated foundations that provide direct services and are run by parents. The League of Welfare Organizations for the Disabled is the major cross-disability umbrella association for more than 100 disability-related civic associations.

Sources of data used in this research include secondary materials, participant observation, and interviews conducted between 2003 and 2007. I collected and reviewed governmental documents on disability welfare, newsletters, and magazines from various disability rights advocacy organizations. I interviewed 38 disability rights activists (including leaders, staff, and participants in both advocacy organizations and service providing organizations) selected through snowball sampling.
Findings

Civic organizations in a quasi-service market

The private management of public facilities policy was first introduced in Taipei in 1994 and quickly adopted nationally. With support from civic organization advocates and government officials, the policy became widely adopted nationally after 1997 (Huang 2000). Implementation of this policy immediately created a quasi-service market for civic organizations, particularly the newly emerging service-oriented NPOs. Under this system, civic organizations and NPOs competed for limited state funding. The state established a set of regulations to determine which organizations would win its social welfare contracts. Thus, service NPOs became subcontractors to the state. The people who would actually use the social welfare program had little opportunity to articulate their needs with respect to the quality and type of service the government made available. In addition, because state funding was limited, NPOs had to find private funding and organize volunteers to manage social services and facilities. NPOs therefore competed for state funding on their ability to obtain private donations as well as on the state’s assessment of the quality of services they could provide. Competing for charitable resources became one of the main tasks of service-oriented NPOs. The service-NPO sector expanded quickly between 1998 and 2007, generating significant competition for limited charitable funds.

Most of the staff members I interviewed at civic organizations, including those at advocacy civic organizations and service NPOs, referenced the difficulty of competing for donations. Even volunteers were cognizant of the problem. For example, one volunteer at a disability rights organization said:

It is very difficult to raise funds for our organizations these days. This is not only a result of the economic downturn. There are simply too many charity NPOs these days. Last week, we held a fundraising festival in Sun Yen-sen Memorial Park. A park regular told me, ‘It is not that I do not want to support your organization. There are simply too many events here. Volunteers approach me every week asking me to donate money or buy some produce from their shelter workshop. I simply do not have enough money to contribute anymore.’ I was speechless and had no idea what to say to her. (Interview #38, 12 August 2003)

Many NPOs turn to public relations campaigns in their competition for donations. Some have started advertising their services in the media in order to compete for donations. Large, professional, service-oriented NPOs have public relations departments and invite celebrities to represent their organizations. Charity events such as concerts and festivals have become routine for many big NPOs. NPO staff members agree that advertising is a necessary evil if their organizations are to survive, but, they say, they are in danger of becoming little more than fundraising machines.

The NPOs that receive state funds to operate a social welfare program may actually struggle because of winning the state’s contract. These contracts demand more
services than they pay for. One staff member of the Yu-chen Foundation expressed relief that his organization had not won a social welfare project in Taipei City:

We did not get this project this time. I am not sure if I should feel good or bad. I feel bad because we did not get the project. It means that our proposal was not good enough and we lost the chance to serve the needy. However, I also feel a lot of relief, because if we got the project, we would have to find more funding to cover the costs. I am not quite sure that we can handle it any more. (Interview #3, 28 April 2003)

This individual’s statement suggests the dilemma that disability rights civic organizations and NPOs face. While NPOs may pursue government contracts as a way to provide better social services, they might not have enough financial resources to provide these services as they intended. Yeh (2005) notes that fundraising became the priority of youth welfare NPOs in Taiwan and that people who work in these organizations express concern over the conflict between fundraising and client interests.

**From advocacy to service provision**

The policy providing for private management of public facilities also indirectly puts pressure on advocacy civic organizations to become service NPOs. This is evidenced in the history of disability civic organizations. Before 1992, local parents’ organizations and the first national parents’ association, Hsin-lu, provided both advocacy and services to disabled people and their families. The disability rights movement at the time advocated for governmental support for disability-related social services and government regulation of private care institutions. Disability civic organizations might receive some funding from the government, but they mostly relied on fundraising to maintain their organizations. In 1992, the Hsin-lu Foundation split and became a service-oriented NPO providing professional service to disabled people. PAPID was then founded as a membership-based advocacy organization aimed at policy research, lobbying, and holding the government accountable for its actions.

The city of Taipei’s introduction of guidelines for private management of public facilities in Taipei in 1994 created new opportunities for civic organizations to professionalize and provide direct services. This also transformed people’s perceptions of welfare programs and NPOs. One activist recalls:

We soon realized that the members of PAPID had started to demand direct service from civic organizations. We used to represent the needy groups in their demands for a governmental welfare program. But when more and more civic organizations started to carry governmental social projects and resources became limited, members wanted to see the ‘meat’ [meaning value] from the organizations. The pre-existing service civic organizations simply could not serve all the needs of the population. (Interview #8, 5 May 2003)

Many local chapters of PAPID started to help local organizations establish foundations to provide direct social services. Some of the early groups started by
parents or parents’ associations include Yu-chen (育成) social welfare foundation in Taipei (started in 1995), Xi-han-er (喜憨兒) social welfare foundation in Kaohsiung city (started in 1995), and the Mu-xin (牧心) Developmental Center in Tai-tong (started in 1997). Xin-Xin-Er (星星兒) focused on autism (started in 1999). Many more foundations followed.

The establishment of so many organizations made it seem as though the state was releasing resources and nurturing a vibrant civil society. However, the state transferred the responsibility of providing services to the NPOs. Because it failed to fully fund these services, this nurturing was attenuated at best. One staff member working for a service non-governmental organization recounted that she had argued at a public hearing: ‘We [civic organizations] have to perform multiple functions: raising charity funds, providing services, and at the same time dealing with state regulations’ (Interview #8, 5 May 2003).

Many studies have shown that when civic organizations and NPOs started to work with the state they faced dilemmas as to whether they should directly engage in social service and governmental policy implementation or continue in their advocacy role (Ku 2000; Liu 2000; Wang 2000). Although PAPID survived as an umbrella advocacy non-governmental organization, many of its local chapters no longer functioned as advocacy groups. Rather, local civic organizations spent more time and energy carrying out governmental social service projects. One member remembers it became less likely that members of the organization would participate in advocacy activities (Interview #6, 5 May 2003). Another active member expressed concern that the local organization would give up its advocacy role to focus on managing a small-scale care center after it won a government contract (Interview #33, 9 August 2003).

The private management of public facilities policy weakened the advocacy activity of civic organizations. Many NPOs emerged to carry out partially funded governmental welfare projects. Both the number of individuals committed to civic organizations and the number of civic organizations increased, but each member had a more superficial commitment to the organizations and therefore a decreased willingness to participate in advocacy. Such organizations began to consist of what Pekkanen (2004) terms ‘members without advocates.’ In Skocpal’s (2003) words, this change results in ‘diminished democracy.’

**Distributive injustice in the social welfare program**

When civic organizations and NPOs compete for state-funded programs, they usually have to find other sources of funding in order to maintain their professionalism and improve their quality of service. The market mechanism pushes NPOs to ‘maximize’ their ‘profits.’ Accordingly, competition to provide services at the lowest possible cost should decrease quality of service. However, NPOs are not profit-seeking organizations. Their ‘consumers’ have little choice in selecting their ‘product’ – the social welfare program. As advocacy groups became ‘managers’ of
social services, the allocation of charity funds and distribution of welfare services became uneven.

Disability rights activists have to deal with ambiguous boundaries between non-profit principles and the profit-making ideology of the market. They do not engage in profit-making, but competing for resources from the government has some similar features. In one case, a well-known welfare NPO contracted with a private public relations firm in order to publicize itself and raise charitable funds. The private company received half of the funds raised as a commission. The public relations firm utilized many resources and funds for advertising on television and other public media and invited well-known celebrities to represent the NPO. The NPO became well known and received a huge amount of donations. The private public relations company also gained significant profit.

Other NPOs criticized the NPO that had contracted with the public relations firm, arguing that it had betrayed its donors by giving half of the funds to the private company. The NPO argued that it had made the best choice and obtained money that would allow it to provide better services. In fact, many large NPOs cooperate with the private sector and celebrity spokespeople in a similar manner, although the profit-sharing approach taken in this case was unusual. One activist who worked for a similar large NPO told me: ‘I really think that it is unethical to hire a private company to publicize our organization, but every NPO is doing it. We have no other choice’ (Interview #27, 30 July 2003). The market had clearly invaded the civil society sector.

In establishing the policy of private management of public facilities, the government set up scales to measure the level of disability and socioeconomic backgrounds of people who would need the services the NPOs provided. If NPOs targeted ‘the easier-to-serve disabled population,’ they could show better ‘outcomes’ to the public, which meant more ‘profit.’ One staff member working in an advocacy organization points out the inherent injustice in this approach:

You know, these days, NPOs are competing to serve fewer disabled people, because you can get better results. In contrast, NPOs are less willing to serve severely disabled populations because it takes more resources. A lot of the time, people with severe disabilities do not make much progress in a short period of time. You just do not get much reward. It is not only that people want to mentally feel like they are helping someone to make progress. Charity donors want to see results as well. (Interview #9, 12 May 2003)

Most interviewees in this study understood that NPOs were designed to help disabled people regardless of their socioeconomic background or the variety of resources they might need. Representatives and members of NPOs constantly expressed anxiety regarding their desire to serve as many people as possible while ensuring that they could compete with other NPOs. Sun (2004) notes that under the marketized system, service NPOs are more likely to target ‘consumers’ from upper middle-class families when they deliver state-sponsored social services because these families are more likely to bring charitable donations. A long-term activist sighed and told me: ‘If the system turns out that rich parents raised a huge
amount of charity funding and mostly used it for their own intellectually disabled children, that is not what we want’ (Interview #28, 30 July 2003). Many said that civic organizations had ‘a long road to go’ before they would be able to provide services in accord with the needs of various disabled populations. When they could not serve everybody, they favored the wealthier segment of the population.

This market mechanism also worsens, or at least does not improve, the gap between urban and rural social welfare programs. When the national advocacy association, PAPID, was founded in 1992, its mission was to bridge the gap in social welfare services in different regions. For example, in Taipei City, a variety of programs and disability pensions were available, while many rural areas still lacked even a budget to build ramps for wheelchair access to buildings. Advocates call this condition ‘one country, two systems,’ emphasizing the discrepancy in welfare systems operating in urban and rural areas within Taiwan. As the social welfare service market formed, small NPOs in rural areas were unable to compete with large NPOs in urban areas. One NPO manager at a small NPO pointed out:

We simply do not have the energy or ability to compete with these well-known foundations. They have all the media attention, government funding, and private donations. They even decide whom they would like to serve. We are taking care of those severely disabled people who were abandoned by these well-known foundations. (Personal conversation, 23 August 2003)

Although his claims require more systematic study, they do suggest that market mechanisms marginalized small NPOs. Another manager of a rural institute expressed his frustration:

I know that PAPID advocates the well-being of disabled people. However, PAPID has to be held responsible for the marginalization of our institute. PAPID advocates and asks the government to set up regulations and standards in order to ensure the quality of social welfare services. However, the government did not provide corresponding funding. We are trying our best to serve the needy population. How can they ask for high quality service, but not give money? Only rich foundations in urban areas can satisfy those regulations. We can only try our best and hope that the government won’t be too picky. (Personal conversation, 25 August 2003)

Even those working in well-funded foundations recognize the uneven distribution of welfare resources and over-reliance on volunteerism among small NPOs operating under insufficient funding. A member of a well-known foundation expressed as much when he said:

We [four foundations] were called the ‘four major gangs’ [四大寇 Si-Da-Kou], because we contracted the most governmental welfare projects. It was not like we really wanted to be in charge of every project, but you need to reach a certain level of professionalism in order to provide good quality services. We actually worked very hard and tried to cover a wide range of needy populations. However, the overall problem is that the government does not provide sufficient resources and at the same time sets up a high standard of regulations. As a result, the big charity foundations worked very hard to get private donations and small NPOs simply could not survive or had to operate on the edge of the law. (Interview #27, 26 June 2003)
Those working in well-funded foundations even recognize that the policy has resulted in uneven distribution of welfare resources and too much reliance on volunteerism among small NPOs operating under insufficient funding. Charity civic organizations such as the United Way in Taiwan (聯合勸募 Lian-he-quan-mu) can do little to offset the inherent inequalities in the system. One United Way representative said: ‘What we can do is very limited. We do not have many resources at all and there are so many demands from different civic associations. All we can do is selectively support some organizations’ (Interview #35, 13 August 2003).

Decentralization of the state further worsened the unequal distribution of social welfare nationwide. In 2000, as a result of the restructuring of the administrative system, local governments became responsible for their own disability welfare budgets. Chou and Kroger (2004) show that although the social protection law passed on a national level, in most parts of the country the local governments were reluctant to execute social policy for their disabled and elderly populations. In practice, ‘community care’ continued to mean family home care with almost no public or governmental support. In many cases, local governments simply ignored welfare services when planning their budgets. Total government spending on welfare actually decreased and was unequally distributed after the new policy came into effect (Chou, Wang, and Lin 2005; Lin 2000; PAPID 2001).

This had an impact on the disability rights movement’s tactics. Lin Hui-fang, the secretary-general of PAPID, explained:

After the decentralization policy, we had to redirect our organizational strategy. The battlefield was at the national level before. Under the new policy, we have to empower local parents’ associations to keep a close eye on the local budget and policy implementation. However, in practice, it is a very difficult task, partly because local parents’ associations usually do not have enough resources to engage in the policy-making process. (Interview #6, 5 May 2003)

Local PAPID leaders noted how much more difficult it was for parents’ associations in rural counties (such as Tainan and Kaohsiung) to establish foundations in order to provide services. Only urban parents’ associations had the resources to do so. An evaluation conducted by PAPID also suggests that institutes in urban and wealthy counties provide services of a much higher quality than those in rural areas.

In short, the marketization of social welfare projects and the decentralization of the government put the responsibility for creating an enabling environment on local civic organizations and governments. While the resources in different regimes have varied, the distributive justice of the welfare program has become questionable. Disability NPOs are incentivized to target urban, middle-class, disabled people who need less support. In urban areas, NPOs are able to get more resources and find more people to serve, while middle-class families bring more resources to civic organizations. Serving people with less need for institutional support makes it possible for NPOs to present their services as more effective. It
allows them to present inflated outcomes to the government, the public, and the media, which puts them in a better position to solicit donations.

**Conclusion**

How does welfare resource expansion in Taiwan affect social movements? This article examines the private management of public facilities and its impact on the disability rights movement in Taiwan. Classic resource mobilization theory suggests that new resources support the development of social movements (Acheson and Williamson 2001; McCarthy and Zald 1987). In addition, marketed-oriented policy transforms social movement organizations’ missions (Priestley 1999). This article shows that the introduction of private management of public facilities policy resulted in increasing numbers of NPOs. However, the policy also created a quasi-market for service NPOs in which civic organizations gained resources from the state to carry out welfare projects. Civic organizations had to compete with each another in order to receive government funding and societal recognition. In this process, a market ideology gradually penetrated into the civic organization sector.

Many social movement organizations have been compelled to manage state welfare projects and restructured to act as service providers. The state reincorporated civil society by releasing welfare projects to NPOs. Although the number of civic organizations increased dramatically in two decades, the level of civic participation and advocacy activities actually decreased. In other words, although the new policy brings new resources to these organizations, they have a weakening voice.

Resource mobilization theory does not emphasize the distribution of public funding and its consequences. In the context of Taiwan, the decentralized welfare spending structure has resulted in an uneven distribution of welfare resources. The new quasi-market could not realize distributive justice in the welfare system. NPOs used market strategies, including spending money on fundraising and signing-on celebrity representatives, to market their services. The distribution of charity resources relied on the civility of the NPOs. Resources tended to be distributed to big NPOs in urban areas. In many cases, rural and small NPOs were forced to run below governmental standards or to close down. Decentralization of the state further marginalized the welfare programs in poor counties. In other words, the result of the quasi-market and the transformation of the civic organization sector resulted in unjust distribution of social welfare services and a weakening of civil society.

The disability rights movement advocated a paradigm switch from charity to rights. In the rights paradigm, it is the state’s responsibility to provide an enabling environment for people with different needs. In the Taiwanese authoritarian developmental state era, disability welfare was considered to be each family’s individual responsibility. This study shows that the post-authoritarian state did commit to welfare state policies that had not been covered during the authoritarian era. Wong
(2004) points out that the developmental state in Taiwan moved toward a welfare state after its democratic transition. He describes the country’s transformation as a reverse of the neoliberal globalization under which many western countries privatized their welfare programs. However, a close analysis of the disability rights movement in Taiwan shows that the state provides scant social services to individual citizens. Instead, it adopted a policy that is heavily reliant on goodwill donations from society. Disability rights continue to be primarily a family responsibility.

Priestley (1999) suggests that marketization of community care policy would redirect the independent living movement in the United Kingdom. Oliver (2009) predicts that the close relations between the state and charity organizations would reshape the goal of the disabled people’s movement. A similar process has occurred in Taiwan. Disability rights civic organizations with a strong membership (such as PAPID) served as national advocacy associations. Under the new government policy, however, advocacy was weakened as organizations diverted their energies to competing for resources so they could provide social services. This quasi-market welfare subcontract system also resulted in uneven distribution of social welfare resources.

Note

1. For analytic purposes, I use the term ‘civic organizations’ to refer to any social groups organized by concerned citizens, including social movement organizations, non-governmental organizations, NPOs, and interest groups. ‘Social movement organization’ usually refers to a social group promoting social change by raising public awareness and reforming public policy. NPOs that provide social services, whether or not they are funded by the government, are also called service-oriented civil organizations.

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