

substantially to the history of public health and redefines the understanding of hygiene as it existed in early nineteenth-century Europe.

NOTES

1. Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic*. (NY: Pantheon Books, 1973.)
2. On Villermé, La Berge acknowledges the influence of William Coleman's classic: *Death is a Social Disease* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982).
3. Weiner points out that Napoleon's support of the Paris Council reflected his strong preference for preventative measures and the ideology of public health in contrast to his vehement distrust of the medical profession (285-286).
4. La Berge cites Katherine Lynch on the "Hermeneutics of suspicion," in her *Family, Class and Ideology in Early Industrial France* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).
5. Margaret Pelling, *Cholera, Fever and English Medicine, 1825-1865* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). A recent interesting addition to the discussion over contagion and anti-contagionism can be found in John V. Pickstone, "Dearth, dirt and fever epidemic: rewriting the history of British 'public health,' 1780-1850," in Terence Ranger and Paul Slack, Eds., *Epidemics and ideas. Essays on the historical perception of pestilence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

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Hartmut Lehmann and Guenther Roth Eds. *Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 397 pp. (cloth)

Stephen Kalberg. *Max Weber's Comparative Historical Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 221 pp. \$18.95 (paper)

(Reviewed by Su-Jen Huang)

Two trends stand out in the fast growing Weber scholarship. The first is to systematize and to reconstruct Weber's oeuvre which is notorious for being incomplete and unsystematic, and therefore hard to access. The second is to reconstruct the intellectual-historical context of Weber's works so that a better comprehension and evaluation of his theses is possible. The first path makes a high demand on the author's logical prowess. The second, profound historical research.

Kalberg has endeavored in the first path for more than a decade. Here comes a major work that will certainly become a required reference regarding Weber's method of historical sociology for years to come. The volume edited by Lehmann and Roth, in contrast, represents another landmark in the second path, following the 1987 collection edited by Mommsen and Osterhammel, *Max Weber and His Contemporaries*. It is a collection of eighteen essays from a 1990 conference, and thus shared with other conference collections the problem of uneven quality. A few entries are not research papers but rather remarks by busy conference goers. But most essays are historical researches of high quality. Several are so informing that no Weber scholar can afford to miss them.

The value of Lehmann and Roth's volume lies on two engagements. The first deals with the intellectual-historical context of Weber's *The Protestant Ethic*. The second debates the correctness of Weber's thesis.

For the first issue, Paul Münch reviews the centuries-long dispute over the Protestant-Catholic contrast in their economic prosperity. He argues that in Germany, after *Kulturkampf*, the stereotypes of the industrious Protestant and the lazy Catholic had

already been hardened, and that Weber could not have evaded the influence of these deep-seated ideas.

Of course, in *The Protestant Ethic* Weber is concerned not only with the Protestant-Catholic contrast, but even more with the Lutheran-Calvinist one. Here Friedrich Wilhelm Graf traces Weber's theological construction in *The Protestant Ethic* back to, among other things, Schneckenburger's antithetical interpretation of Lutheranism and Calvinism, an interpretation now disputed. Weber adheres to Schneckenburger's construction which posed an image of traditional Lutheranism and modernizing Calvinism which was supposed to reflect a religious psychological antithesis of passivity/activity of these two denominations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With this image Lutheranism is seen as closer to traditionalist Catholicism than to Calvinism in terms of its effect on life conduct, and thereby perpetuated traditionalism and authoritarianism in Germany.

Roth studies the Anglophilia of Weber the would-be Englishman. In his story, German liberal scholars had for long acknowledged a historical connection between English Puritanism and contemporary democracy, world power, and capitalism. With this liberal legacy before him, Weber's hatred over his Lutheran heritage and German authoritarian politics leads him to model his notion of ethical personality and inner-worldly asceticism after an idealized image of English history, especially of Puritanism. In addition, Weber is a descendant of cosmopolitan bourgeois families operating in England as well as in Germany. Another interesting point is that Weber may have misread the spirit of his ancestors and relatives who served as models in his portrait of modern capitalists. Among them, according to Roth, some were old style merchants; many were cosmopolitan adventure capitalists who made big fortunes in business across England and Continental Europe. An ascetic economic ethic or the spirit of capitalism can hardly be found in them.

Lehmann reviews the work history and content of Weber's and Sombart's studies concerning the rise of modern capitalism and its spirit. He concludes that their theses are developed at least partly as the result of the dialogue between them, that Weber seems to regard Sombart's studies as complementary rather than contradictory to his, and that Weber maintains a consistent position while Sombart wavers.

The debate over the correctness of Weber's Protestant ethic thesis starts with Malcolm H. MacKinnon's provocative essay, which is a restatement of his 1988 articles in the *British Journal of Sociology*. MacKinnon attempts, by rereading religious texts cited by Weber, to refute one essential link in Weber's causal chain that leads to Calvinist inner-worldly asceticism; namely, the concept of predestination and its resulting crisis of proof. To MacKinnon, the concept of predestination, significant to Calvin, had not been preserved in Puritanism. Consequently, there was no crisis of proof nor the doctrine of worldly calling that were supposed to lead to inner-worldly asceticism. MacKinnon's essay is well written and strongly worded. For a reader not well versed in Puritan theology and therefore not capable of judging the merit of his argument, the most likely question is why has Weber's supposedly apparent theological blunder not been debunked much earlier? This curiosity is somehow satisfied by David Zaret's no less strongly worded rebuff of MacKinnon.

Zaret accuses MacKinnon of wrenching texts out of their context, ignoring contradictory texts of the authors cited, and ignoring other contemporary sources and secondary literature. Only by these abuses, Zaret concludes, could MacKinnon reach an erroneous reading of Puritan ethic which differs from Weber's. In his turn, Zaret uses

texts of theological and pastoral works by Calvin and Puritan authors, corroborated with contemporary biographies, diaries, and letters, places them in the context of their argument, and as a result, obtains an interpretation that supports Weber's conception of Puritanism.

Kaspar von Greyerz joins the debate and stands between MacKinnon and Zaret. Based on his reading of seventeenth-century autobiographies, he agrees with Weber that Puritanism did show strong inner-worldly asceticism. On the other hand, Greyerz agrees with MacKinnon that Weber indeed overestimates the importance of predestination. To Greyerz, what concerned the majority of seventeenth-century laity was not predestination, but, increasingly as the century progressed, special providence; that is, God's presence in their daily lives. And providentialism generally presupposes universal grace, which contradicts predestinationism. Greyerz's essay is instructive in that it attempts an alternative explanation to the Puritan inner-worldly asceticism, a mode of thinking rarely taken in Weber scholarship.

In a related essay James A. Henretta studies the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries religious and economic history of New England and yields support to Weber's Protestant ethic thesis.

The volume also includes several interesting essays which seem not so relevant to its stated concern. Among them, Hubert Treiber's essay studies Nietzsche's conception and practice of monastery for freer spirits, which are said to parallel Weber's concept of sect as breeding ground of personality. Klaus Lichtblau's essay on the new ethic of eroticism and free love imposes a new burden on Weber by asserting that these were "the main problem of Max Weber and his period." Harvey S. Goldman poetically reinterprets Weber's conception of calling, asceticism, and personality, with his concept, "empowerment of the self," while admitting that Weber has explicitly dealt with neither self nor empowerment. Philip Benedict discusses why Weber's Protestant ethic thesis is, in general, ignored by the historiography of Continental Calvinism. Hans Rollmann provides an interesting report on Weber's tour of America that helped shape his view of Puritanism.

Overall, Lehmann and Roth's volume is an informing collection for those concerned with the background and merit of Weber's Protestant ethic thesis.

Completely different from Lehmann and Roth's volume is Kalberg's book. This is a painstaking reconstruction of Weber's method of comparative historical sociology, in the most extreme sense of the word "reconstruction." Kalberg attempts to make explicit—in detail—the procedures and research strategies Weber often employs implicitly—or even unconsciously. And Kalberg carries out this formidable job with a practical purpose. Constantly contrasting Weber's method with that of contemporary comparative historical sociology, which he laments all the way, Kalberg seems to be developing a Weberian methodology textbook for future historical sociologists. The job is well done, with qualifications to be dealt with later.

To Kalberg, there are three major schools in contemporary comparative historical sociology: world system (Wallerstein), interpretive historical (Bendix, Tilly), and causal analytic (Moore, Skocpol). They all suffer to various degrees the following dilemmas and problems: lack of explicit linkage between agency and structure (all), insufficient adherence to multicausality (world system and causal analytic), inappropriate level of analysis (world system with pre-formulated theory, the other two with delineated problems only), lacking hypothesis-forming models (all), and lack of explicit causal procedures (world system and interpretive historical).

With his dense, logic-intensive reconstruction of Weber's procedures and research strategies, Kalberg seeks to demonstrate that Weber provides a model for comparative historical sociology since it alone overcomes the dilemmas and problems identified above. Weber's emphasis on methodological individualism, *Verstehen* (interpretive understanding), four types of social action, and a pluralism of motives enables him to link agency to structure by means of ideal types of patterned action orientation. These ideal types of patterned action orientation and their carriers, together with the independent causal forces of historical events and accidents, geographical factors, technological innovations, power, and conflict, further enable Weber to attend to multicausal analysis.

In fact, in Kalberg's analysis, the fundamental strength of Weber's method lies in his insisting on the construction and use of ideal types. The formation of ideal types out of inexhaustible chaos of reality endows Weber with a heuristic tool to overcome the problem in causal analysis of being either blinded by a pre-formulated theory (as world system theory) or without a theory at all (as interpretive historical and causal analytic approaches). These ideal types also serve as hypothesis-forming models which provide empirically-testable analytic generalizations capable of guiding research.

In Kalberg's reconstruction, Weber's ideal types further provide his research with causal methodology and theoretical framework. Weber's causal methodology distinguishes between facilitating and necessary orientations of patterned action, and between synchronic and diachronic interactions of patterned action. In Kalberg's jargon-loaded formulation, "a *contextual* mode of explanation endowed with the analytic power to conceptualize *hosts* of patterned action-orientation and the *conjunctural* relationships between them is required" for an adequate causal explanation (147). This causal methodology is made possible by the theoretical framework based on Weber's domain and domain-specific ideal types which Kalberg appreciates as of universal range of comparison unseen in contemporary schools.

Kalberg's meticulous reconstruction of Weber's procedures and research strategies is indeed impressive. In terms of its comprehensive and conciseness, it is probably comparable only to Wolfgang Schluchter's reconstruction of Weber's oeuvre. If we are to look for trouble in these kinds of reconstruction, the most apparent one may be that they are too perfect to be true. Using Weber's terminology, what Kalberg has constructed may be called an ideal type of Weber's procedures and strategies which can not be found in any single work of Weber's or even in Weber's own words anywhere. That is why Kalberg has to repeat sentences like "Weber never discusses this issue explicitly in these terms" (31, note 24), "I have extracted them from these substantive texts" (159, note 24), "systematic procedures and strategies designed to establish causality lie concealed in his substantive texts" (199), etc. I also get uneasy when I read Kalberg saying that Weber does this or that "at this stage" (180), as if Weber really observes this standard procedure.

In fact, if an interpreter is allowed to straighten out things Weber employs but has not himself thought through, I find Kalberg's ideal-typical reconstruction of Weber's methodology quite authentic, as far as the methodology used in Weber's last five years is concerned. And this last-five-years is the real problem with Kalberg's reconstruction. Kalberg recognizes the essential strength of Weber's methodology as lying in the construction and use of ideal types that Kalberg regards as of universal range of comparison. Yet these ideal types of universal range appear only in *The Economic Ethics of the World Religions*, which begins in 1915, five years before Weber's death in 1920; and *Economy and Society*, which is published posthumously. They cannot be found in Weber's studies of German agrarian transformation in the 1890s, which brought him immediate fame

and an early professorship; or in his studies of Mediterranean Antiquity in the 1890s and 1900s; or in his 1904–1905 *The Protestant Ethic*, probably the only Weber classic that today's sociology graduate students will all be required to read. Most sociologists probably will be surprised to learn that *The Protestant Ethic* as “while providing a superb illustration of the methodology of *Verstehen*, the intentional ‘one-sided’ emphasis upon ‘ideal’ configurations disqualifies this study as an example of the mode of causal analysis Weber practices in his substantive texts” (143). The “substantive texts” Kalberg relies on for his reconstruction, strictly speaking, exclude everything Weber publishes before 1915.

But what makes Weber so respected in the German academic world before 1915 is not only *Verstehen*. His *Verstehen* is hailed precisely because it has been used to produce insightful causal analysis in empirical studies in which causal inference always relies on comparison and ideal constructions of some kind. How do we characterize Weber's causal method before 1915 if it disqualifies itself as Weberian by Kalberg's standard?

As Kalberg has perfectly labeled, Weber's ideal types, compiled in *Economy and Society* (and used in *The Economic Ethics of the World Religions*) should be regarded as “the theoretical yield” of his decades-long empirical studies. It takes more than two decades in cross-civilizations, cross-epochs, and cross-domains comparative studies—and most of the time without being burdened with teaching—to assemble that body of knowledge and historical insight which eventually gives birth to those ideal types of universal range and multicausality Kalberg recognizes as Weberian. If it takes even Weber so long to accomplish this, maybe Kalberg should not be so depressed to find that contemporary historical sociologists, among them no less Bendix, the later dean of Weber scholarship, all fail to produce their own version of *Economy and Society*.

Professor Kalberg Replies:

Su-Jen Huang's detailed discussion has largely captured the major purposes and procedures of my *Max Weber's Comparative-Historical Sociology*. I very much appreciate his attentive reading, and welcome the opportunity to comment briefly upon his review.

It is true that *publication* of *The Economic Ethics of the World Religions* and *Economy and Society* came later in Weber's life or posthumously, but, quite clearly, he had been working intensely on these studies at least since 1909. Although I did not intend to detract from Weber's dissertation, *Habilitation*, or other publications of the 1890s, these more historical studies do not contain a comparative-historical *mode of causal analysis*. This was my specific concern.

Because this mode of causal analysis *combines* the “ideal” and “material” sides of the causal equation, it is also not to be found in *The Protestant Ethic*. Weber's own qualification on the last page of this volume (“. . . it can not, of course, be my intention [here] to substitute for a one-sided “materialistic” an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and history. . . . *Both are equally possible*. But, if either [such investigation] claims to be the conclusion rather than the preliminary research, historical truth is served equally poorly.” [*The Protestant Ethic*, p. 183; my transl.]) clearly indicates that he does not regard this “cultural essay,” however significant as a superb illustration of the *verstehende* methodology of subjective meaning, as offering the kind of complex causal methodology—which also includes *Verstehen*—he deems adequate.